The Nordic region's new military reality

The Nordic Region has been transformed into a northern front against Russia, have renounced political sovereignty, and are allowing US forces to settle right next to Russia's borders.

Today, the Nordic Region has been transformed into a northern front against Russia, tied to the mast of an aircraft carrier soon to be commanded by Donald Trump. As a bloc, the Nordics have renounced political sovereignty and are allowing US forces to settle right next to Russia's borders.

Let us recall: During the last Cold War, the Nordic region was a military low-voltage area and took on the role of bridge builder between East and West. Russia's invasion of Ukraine moved political mountains. In a flash, the entire Nordic region became a NATO area. Finland and Sweden said goodbye to their historic status as neutral states and became NATO's 31st and 32nd member states. At the same time, the US signed bilateral agreements with Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland, gaining access to 47 areas where it can establish a military presence.

A series of NATO expansions to the east since 1999, disarmament agreements being terminated, a steady flow of Western weapons to Ukraine, and now; help to Ukraine to carry out missile attacks inside Russia, have brought us to the brink of a nuclear confrontation with Moscow.

In Norway, all parties in the Storting have entered into an agreement that will guarantee that NOK 611 billion more will be spent on the defense of Norway over the next 12 years. Total military expenditure will then be NOK 1,624 billion up to 2036. In addition, there is the so-called “Nansen program” for Ukraine, which is constantly being expanded. The parties have committed to allocating 135 billion until 2030. That means at least 15 billion annually, money that alone would save the municipal economy. But politicians are prioritizing prolonging the war.

When Trump is back in the White House, spending on the war industry could be further increased. He may demand that Europe shoulders even more of the costs to secure the interests of the American empire.

The seriousness of the High North

From what seems to be another age (September 2020), there is a report written by Tormod Heier, commissioned by the Norwegian Peace Council, Nei til Atomvåpen and Norwegian Physicians Against Nuclear Weapons. In “The Nordic region as a low-voltage area - what can Norway do?” he provides an analysis of the situation in the High North and proposes measures to reduce the risk of war.

Heier writes: “Confidence-building measures are crucial to avoid the escalation of unforeseen incidents. Such preventive activities are particularly important when trust between the US and Russia is at an all-time low, and when Russian, American, Norwegian and British aircraft and vessels are increasingly operating in each other's vicinity, closer to civilian and military installations on the Norwegian and Russian sides. In the event of an accident, misunderstanding or misinterpretation on the part of either party, for example between American B52 bombers with Norwegian fighter escorts and Russian aircraft and vessels in the Barents Sea, the situation could quickly escalate."

In the chapter “The seriousness of the High North”, Heier identifies two particularly serious factors: A geopolitical development in which the warning time between the US and Russia has become ever shorter, and increased uncertainty about whether threats consist of missiles with conventional or nuclear warheads.

New missile technology contributes to shorter warning times. The period between the onset of a crisis and the firing of missiles seems alarmingly short. Russia possesses missiles that travel at five times the speed of sound (hypersonic), making them almost impossible to defend against. American forces, on the other hand, are moving ever closer to the Russian Northern Fleet, which contains some of Russia's most advanced nuclear weapons. As Norway, Sweden and Finland become more closely integrated into a US-led defense partnership, the threat to Russian nuclear forces increases.

Both sides have several weapons systems where it is not possible to distinguish between nuclear and conventional explosives. This means that decision-makers on the American and Russian sides will have less and less time to make the right decisions if a crisis occurs. Increased automation and artificial intelligence exacerbate the problem. To speed up the decision-making process, the authority to launch nuclear weapons has also been delegated to leaders further down the chain of command. Today, we have smaller, more precise and thus more “user-friendly” nuclear weapons. When such “tactical” nuclear weapons do not necessarily lead to the total annihilation of humanity, it can lower the threshold for using them.

In sum, this means an increased risk of uncontrolled events. “For all practical purposes, the consequences will be irreparable,” writes Tormod Heier.

Confidence-building measures

He therefore recommends confidence-building measures to reduce fear and uncertainty. The aim is to build trust between the Russian and Nordic authorities, which will be crucial to prevent a conflict where nuclear weapons are put on standby.

Measures that regulate the behavior and maneuvers of military forces are necessary. For example, regulating the freedom of movement of NATO forces east of the 24th longitude in Finnmark and in the Barents Sea (i.e. east of Hammerfest), regulating access for certain weapons systems, especially in sensitive areas, and banning aircraft and vessels from certain areas. The aim is to give Russian, American and Nordic authorities the greatest possible room for maneuver to deal with unforeseen events.

Specifically, Heier launched five measures:
1. Student exchange between Nordic and Russian defense colleges.
2. Establish a Nordic-Russian contact center to strengthen communication channels.
3. Establish local low-voltage zones with permanent restrictions on the presence of aircraft and naval vessels, e.g. in the strait between Svalbard, Bjørnøya and Hammerfest.
4. Restrictions on military training activities, partly linked to geographical areas and partly to the operational characteristics of the military forces.
5. Expansion of the UN's Incident at Sea regime, to institutionalize as many common rules of the road as possible in the Norwegian-Russian operational areas.

It's fine to bring up Heier's report now to show that only a short time ago it was possible for a professor at the Staff College to warn against unbridled militarization. But instead of promoting Heier's confidence-building measures, the Nordic Region is united behind a boundless belief in militarism, based on fear, mistrust, tension and hostility towards its eastern neighbor.

The US military is settling in

During the last Cold War, Norway had clear reservations about allied forces in Norway. There were to be no foreign bases in Norway in peacetime, nuclear weapons were not to be stored on Norwegian soil, allied ships calling at Norwegian ports had to guarantee that they did not have nuclear weapons on board, and there were clear restrictions on military exercises near the Russian border.

Now we see that these restrictions are being waived. Calling the 12 US bases “agreed areas” fools no one, believing that the US respects the nuclear weapons ban is an insult to the intellect; tactical nuclear weapons are likely to be stored at the base at Rygge, and US aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines are very likely to have nuclear weapons on board. Exercises in which American B52 bombers are escorted by Norwegian and Nordic fighters along the Russian border have become almost routine.

During the previous Cold War, the aim was to deter the Soviet Union from attacking. Article V of the NATO pact played a key role in this, as it was intended to secure help from the USA. But it was equally important to balance this with reassurance. Moscow should not fear that Norwegian territory would be used in an attack to the east.

This balance is now gone. When Norwegian and Nordic politicians unleash US military forces in the Nordic region, the chances of becoming a theatre of war increase dramatically.

Sources:

«Et historisk forsvarsløft for å trygge Norge», regjeringen.no 05.04.24, «Regjeringen vil øke støtten til Ukraina», vg.no20.09.24, Tormod Heier «Norden som lavspenningsområde – hva kan Norge gjøre?», rapport september 2020, «Nå er et av verdens største hangarskip fremme i Indre Oslofjord», nrk.no 01.11.24, «Amerikansk B-52 bombefly fløy over Nord-Norge», forsvaretsforum.no 07.11.24, «Amerikansk general i Norge: – Vi må være klare nå», forsvaretsforum.no 29.08.24